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Abstract: 
This article examines whether racially derogatory cartoons are capable of infringing Part 
IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). In particular, it examines the exemption 
of 'artistic work' in section 18D, which depends on the artistic work being published 
'reasonably'. Courts have struggled to apply the concept of 'reasonableness' to 
cartoons, noting that cartoons are exaggerated by their nature and that they often 
convey political messages. 
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Racially derogatory cartoons, when published in a newspaper, may be grounds for a 
complaint under Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA).1 For 
example, a cartoon drawn by Bill Leak and published in The Australian newspaper in 
August 2016 was the subject of a complaint to the Australian Human Rights 
Commission. The cartoon suggested that Indigenous fathers are neglectful alcoholics 
who cannot remember their child’s name. It was published during public debate 
concerning the treatment of young Indigenous detainees at the Don Dale Youth 
Detention Centre in the Northern Territory.  
Such cartoons raise difficult issues under Part IIA. On the one hand, Part IIA has a 
relatively low threshold for liability. Section 18C provides that conduct which is 
‘reasonably likely … to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate a person or group ... 
because of their race’ is unlawful. However, courts have clarified that s 18C applies only 
to conduct causing ‘profound and serious effects, not to be likened to mere slights’.2 
                                                           
1 This article focuses on national laws, rather than State and Territory based anti-vilification laws. 
2 Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352 [16] (Kiefel J). See also Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261 [268] 
(Bromberg J). 
Racially derogatory cartoons may infringe this standard. On the other hand, s 18D has 
several broad exemptions to liability, including an exemption concerning ‘artistic work’.3 
To come within the exemption, the conduct must be done ‘reasonably and in good faith’, 
and this has been interpreted as requiring proportionality between the purpose of the 
conduct, and the harm it is likely to cause.4 However, Gleeson CJ has questioned how 
courts can determine whether a cartoon, which ‘of its nature is intended to lampoon or 
ridicule ... [and which] is an appropriate and very common form of political commentary’, 
was done reasonably.5 
This article argues that defamation law can provide guidance to courts in determining 
whether a satirical communication is published ‘reasonably’, because defamation law is 
similar to Part IIA in several significant ways. Both impose civil liability for expressive 
conduct, and the harms of defamation are similar to those of racial vilification. Also, the 
defences in defamation law are similar to the exemptions in s 18D, and both are 
supported by public interest grounds.  
Most significantly, the concept of reasonableness is part of the Lange defence,6 which 
concerns communications relating to politics and government. As indicated by Gleeson 
CJ’s statement above, cartoons published in newspapers are often presented and 
understood as a form of political commentary. Clearly, there is a legitimate public 
interest in facilitating communication on political matters. However, Lange emphasises 
that accuracy of information is central to showing that a communication to a wide 
audience on a political issue is done ‘reasonably’. Likewise, this article argues that 
ensuring reasonable accuracy of information is also central to the ‘reasonably and in 
good faith’ requirement in s 18D. This is because factually accurate information may be 
considered less likely to cause harm to target groups (and therefore to be found to be 
proportionate). Also, significant social harm can be caused by the dissemination of 
inaccurate racial stereotypes. Therefore, the artistic exemption in s 18D should be 
interpreted as requiring factual accuracy, as an aspect of reasonableness. 
Part IIA of the RDA 
Part IIA contains s 18C, which defines certain conduct as unlawful, and s 18D, which 
exempts certain conduct from liability. Section 18C is unique among racial vilification 
laws in that it specifically focuses on the likely effect of certain conduct on members of 
                                                           
3 RDA s 18D (a). 
4 Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 204 ALR 761 (Bropho). 
5 Transcript of Proceedings, Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2005] HCATrans 9 (4 
February 2005).  
6 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
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the target group (the racial or ethnic group about whom the statements are made).7 The 
legal test is whether a reasonable member of this group would be offended, insulted, 
humiliated or intimidated by the relevant conduct. The test is therefore objective, rather 
than being based on the subjective response of members of the target group.8 In 
addition, the relevant conduct must be done ‘because of the race’ of the relevant person 
or group.9 Again, this is determined objectively, by examining the respondent’s conduct 
and the surrounding circumstances.10 Finally, s 18C applies only to conduct that is done 
‘otherwise than in private’.11 In effect, this means that the section applies only to 
conduct that is likely to seen or heard by others.12 These principles are similar to those 
for determining liability under defamation law. 
Section 18C applies to conduct that is likely to offend, insult or humiliate or intimidate 
members of the target group, because of their race, and it does not require threatening 
conduct or even proof of a malicious motive.13 Although it has been argued that s 18C 
sets the standard for liability too low,14 this article will show that ridicule and insult are 
established grounds for liability in defamation law.15 Defamation law specifically 
recognises that publications which ridicule or insult a person can cause significant 
reputational harm, and that a respondent’s humorous intent does not necessarily 
preclude liability.  
Scholars such as Jeremy Waldron16 and Michael Chesterman17 highlight the similarities 
between the purposes of defamation law and racial vilification laws, particularly 
regarding the types of harms they seek to prevent and remedy. In broad terms, racial 
vilification laws seek to address two distinct but related types of harms. First, such laws 
address the direct, discriminatory harms of conduct that designates members of target 
groups as inherently inferior or subordinate.18 Katharine Gelber argues that racial 
                                                           
7 Racial vilification laws in other jurisdictions in Australia focus on the likely response of those who witness the 
relevant conduct, but who are not members of the target group. See, eg. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 20C 
(1) (NSW ADA). 
8 Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261, [241] Bromberg J. 
9 RDA s 18C (1) (b). 
10 Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261, [303]-[308] Bromberg J. 
11 RDA s 18c (1). 
12 Korczak v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HREOC 29 (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Commissioner Innes, 16 December 1999) [48]–[52]. 
13 As mentioned above, the respondent’s reason for doing the relevant conduct is determined objectively. 
Although the heading to Part IIA refers to ‘racial hatred’, proof of such hatred is not required: Eatock v Bolt (2011) 
197 FCR 261 [225] (Bromberg J). 
14 See Dan Meagher, ‘So Far So Good? A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia’ (2004) 32(2) 
Federal Law Review 225. 
15 Considering the interpretation of s 18C as conduct that amounts to a significant public harm. 
16 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, 2012) ch 3. 
17 Michael Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A delicate plant (Ashgate, 2000) 202–26. 
18 See, eg. Katharine Gelber, Speaking Back: The free speech versus hate speech debate (John Benjamins Publishing, 
2002) 53–5. 
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vilification is ‘used by powerful racially defined groups to limit the way less powerful 
racially defined groups can participate in society’.19 She argues that racial vilification 
reinforces a ‘systemic asymmetry between the speaker and members of the target 
group.’20 This is consistent with s 18C’s focus on the direct effect of particular conduct 
on members of the target group, and on protecting their dignity.21  
The second type of harm of racial vilification is reputational, which relates to a person’s 
standing in the community and how they are perceived by others. Defamation law 
recognises the seriousness of reputational harm, as it can result in stigmatisation and 
exclusion of targeted persons from society. This article will argue that this second type 
of harm is analogous to the harms of defamation. Therefore, defamation law may be 
relevant to interpreting Part IIA, and particularly, the exemptions in s 18D. This article 
will now highlight some further similarities with defamation law. 
Principles of defamation law in Australia 
Defamation in Australia consists of any publication that is likely to lower the plaintiff’s 
‘standing in the community’, or to cause others to think less of him or her.22 Defamation 
therefore concerns injury to a person’s reputation, or disparagement or denigration of 
their character. In particular, defamation law recognises ridicule as a form of 
denigration. Defamation law also shares a number of significant similarities with s 18C.  
First, defamation and s 18C both use an objective test. In defamation law, the standard 
is that of a ‘reasonable, ordinary member of the audience’.23 Under s 18C, the standard 
is that of a reasonable member of the target group.24  Assessing conduct objectively 
involves examining the particular words used, and the surrounding circumstances. A 
respondent’s intentions or motivation regarding the publication are strictly irrelevant to 
whether it is defamatory.25 
Second, liability for defamation depends on the relevant material being ‘published’ to at 
least one person other than the person defamed. Similarly, s 18C applies only to 
conduct that is done ‘otherwise than in private’. Therefore, defamation and s 18C both 
concern harm to a person’s public standing, rather than their personal feelings.26 
                                                           
19 Ibid 73. 
20 Ibid 77, 87. Gelber emphasises that target groups are often vulnerable and marginalised racial groups. 
21 Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261 [225] Bromberg J. 
22 Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16 [36] per French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ 
(Chesterton). In 2006, ‘uniform’ defamation laws were enacted in every Australian state and territory: see Patrick 
George, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2017) ch 3. 
23 Chesterton (n 22) [31]. 
24 Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261, [241] Bromberg J. 
25 Lee v Wilson and McKinnon (1934) 51 CLR 276, 288. However, a respondent’s purpose may be relevant to certain 
defences to defamation, and exemptions in Part IIA. 
26 Chesterman (n 17) 205. 
Third, defamation law recognises several defences to liability. Similarly, s 18D contains 
several exemptions to liability. The wording of some exemptions in s 18D pick up the 
wording of defences to defamation, such as ‘reasonably’ and ‘public interest’. The 
defences to defamation, like the exemptions in s 18D, define conduct that has some 
public interest aspect.27 Defamation defences that are relevant to political cartoons will 
now be examined. 
Ridicule and political comment in defamation law 
Publications that expose a person to ridicule may be defamatory. In fact, a traditional 
definition of defamation is statements that expose a person to ‘hatred, ridicule or 
contempt’.28 Although this is not the current definition of defamation in Australia,29 
publications that expose a person to ridicule or contempt may nonetheless lower a 
person’s standing in the community. 
In 1998, Pauline Hanson obtained an injunction preventing a national radio station from 
broadcasting a satirical song about her.30 Despite the song’s satirical intentions, the 
Court regarded it as defamatory, as it exposed her to ridicule and contempt. The Court 
stated that the song contained ‘grossly offensive imputations relating to the sexual 
orientation and preference of a Member of Parliament’ which were not accurate and 
were simply a ‘fairly mindless effort at cheap denigration’.31 
Whether a publication is defamatory or not depends on the perspective of a reasonable 
audience member or reader, and not on the motivation or intention of the speaker or 
author. Therefore, comics and comedians face potential liability for defamation if a court 
determines that a reasonable audience member or reader may interpret their words as 
                                                           
27 In relation to defamation law, see Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) 37, 66. In 
relation to Part IIA, see Meagher (n 14) 241. 
28 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105 at 108 (Parke B). The definition of vilification in the NSW ADA is based 
on this wording. 
29 Chesterton (n 22) [16]. 
30 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Hanson [1998] QCA 306 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 
Court of Appeal, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and McPherson JA, 28 September 1998). 
31 Ibid [8]. This decision has been criticised on the grounds that the song constituted ‘political discussion’ regarding 
Senator Hanson and the policies of her party, One Nation. See Adrienne Stone, ‘Freedom of Political 
Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26(2) Federal Law Review 219, 382–3; Dan 
Meagher, ‘What is “Political Communication”? The Rationale and Scope of the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication’ (2004) 28(2) Melbourne University Law Review 438, 469–70; Chesterman (n 17) 149; Roger 
Magnusson, ‘Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and other Challenges’ (2001) 9 
Torts Law Journal 269, 281. 
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serious factual statements.32  Also, if one interpretation of the relevant words is 
defamatory, then it is irrelevant that another interpretation may not be.33  
Descriptions of a person that present them as ridiculous may be defamatory. Examples 
would include describing an actor as ‘hideously ugly’,34 or a professional rugby league 
player as ‘fat’ and ‘slow’.35 Attributing negative characteristics to a person, based on 
their appearance, is one type of conduct (among others) to which racial vilification laws 
may apply. Racial slurs (particularly in cartoons) often involve attributing negative 
characteristics to members of particular racial groups, who may be identifiable due to 
some aspect of their physical appearance. 
For example, in Carey v Nationwide News Pty Ltd,36 an Aboriginal sportsperson was 
described in a prominent newspaper as having an ‘apeish’ appearance and as ‘Cro-
Magnon’. The Court held that derogatory references to a person’s appearance (rather 
than their conduct) may be defamatory, particularly if it exposed the plaintiff to ridicule.37 
The Court emphasised that statements ridiculing a person may lower their reputation in 
the community, particularly as they ‘belittle[d] [the plaintiff’s] achievements’.38 
Additionally, the descriptions exposed the plaintiff to contempt, as they described him as 
sub-human and animal-like,39 which may cause others to shun or avoid the plaintiff.40 
The Court emphasised that the description of the plaintiff as ‘apeish’ was specifically 
linked in the publication to his Aboriginal heritage.41  
Therefore, the target of a racial slur (including ridicule) may be entitled to a remedy 
under defamation law.42 However, defamation law may offer no remedy in respect of a 
racially derogatory cartoon (such as Bill Leak’s). One possible obstacle is the 
requirement that the defamatory publication be ‘of or concerning’ the plaintiff.43 This 
                                                           
32 See, eg, Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd [2012] SASCFC 99 (Unreported, Kourakis CJ, Gray and Blue JJ, Supreme 
Court of South Australia, 24 August 2012), in which the Court determined that a ‘joke’ suggesting marital infidelity 
by a female celebrity, made by a well-known comedian on a television program, was defamatory. 
33 Ibid [113]. The Court referred to the principle that ‘for a joke to be harmless [that is, not defamatory], it must be 
benign’. 
34 Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008. 
35 Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449.  
36 [2014] NSWDC 73 (Unreported, Gibson DCJ, New South Wales District Court, 20 June 2014). 
37 Ibid [9]. 
38 Ibid [12]. 
39 Ibid. See also Trad v Jones (No 3) [2007] NSWADT 318, in which the respondent was found to have breached the 
NSW ADA by describing male Lebanese youths as ‘vermin’. The tribunal, at [174], stated that ‘One of the most 
contemptuous forms of commentary on another person or group is to describe them in sub-human terms, such as 
likening them to insects, vermin or animals’. 
40 In Chesterton, the High Court held that ‘matter might be defamatory if it caused a plaintiff to be shunned or 
avoided, which is to say excluded from society’ [4]. 
41 Ibid [20]. Therefore, in other contexts, referring to a person as ‘apeish’ may not be defamatory.  
42 Similarly, in Patten v Moffatt (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Levine J, 27 February 1995), the 
Court held that calling an Aboriginal person a ‘coon’ could be defamatory. 
43 Knuppfer v London Express Newspaper [1944] AC 116, 121. 
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requirement generally prevents members of a group from suing for defamation in 
respect of a slur against the group (rather than against an individual). 
Another possible obstacle is the existence of a defence under defamation law. Most 
relevantly, in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,44 the High Court of Australia 
held that communications concerning ‘government and politics’ are generally immune 
from liability under defamation law. The scope of ‘government and politics’ is uncertain, 
however it includes statements concerning a person’s conduct in public office and their 
fitness for such office, and matters that may affect voting decisions.45 Cartoons 
concerning racial issues may be regarded as political communication, as they may 
influence voting decisions. However, the Lange defence also requires that the relevant 
publication is done ‘reasonably’, and this involves assessing what the respondent did to 
ensure the accuracy of the communication. ‘Reasonableness’ is therefore required for 
the protection of political communications from liability under defamation law (under 
Lange), and also for the exemptions in s 18D under federal anti-vilification law. 
The exemption of ‘artistic work’ in s 18D 
Although s 18D contains several exemptions to liability, this article focuses on the 
exemption relating to the ‘distribution of an artistic work’,46 as this relates most directly 
to cartoons published in the mainstream media.47 This exemption is extremely broad in 
several aspects. First, although the exemption concerns ‘artistic work’, it has been 
interpreted as requiring no assessment of artistic merit, and it includes all forms of art, 
including literature and other forms of writing.48 McCutcheon notes that ‘it seems widely 
accepted … that cartoons are artistic works.’49 Also, unlike other exemptions, the one 
for artistic work does not require the conduct to be done for a particular purpose, such 
as an ‘academic’ or ‘scientific’ purpose. Finally, unlike the other exemptions, the artistic 
work does not need to be ‘of public interest’ or done ‘in the public interest’.  
In defamation law, there is no defence for artistic work per se, and the reasons are 
unclear for including this exception in s 18D50 (and particularly an exemption of such 
                                                           
44 (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
45 The implied freedom of political communication derives from ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution, which provide that 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate must be ‘directly chosen’ by the Australian people.  
46 RDA s 18D (1)(a). 
47 While the defence of fair and accurate reporting might seem relevant, a cartoon would not be a report but more 
likely an opinion. 
48 See Bryl v Kovacevic [1999] HREOCA 11 (21 June 1999) [4.3] and Corunna v West Australian Newspapers Ltd 
(2001) EOC 93–146, 40. See Jani McCutcheon, ‘The Artistic Speech Exemption in Australian Racial Discrimination 
Regulation’ (2019) 23 Media and Arts Law Review 61, 74–8. 
49 Ibid 76. 
50 On these exemptions, see McCutcheon (n 48) and Luke McNamara Regulating Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in 
Australia (Sydney Institute of Criminology, 2002). 
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wide breadth).51 It may be assumed that artistic works (including cartoons) are not as 
harmful as ‘factually wrong statements’.52 Further, scholars argue that artistic freedom is 
an essential part of political discussion and is supported by the democratic justifications 
for free speech.53 Specifically, political cartoons may assist in holding public figures to 
account and they may challenge ‘intolerant attitudes held in parts of the community’.54 
In Bropho,55 the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the exemption of ‘artistic 
work’ in s 18D, and in particular the requirement that the relevant conduct be done 
‘reasonably and in good faith’. The cartoon at issue in Bropho  
lampooned the involvement of Aboriginal persons, including the appellant, in, and the connection 
to and the significance to them of, the return from the United Kingdom of the skull of Yagan, a 
prominent Aboriginal figure in the history of the colonial settlement in the State after 1829. 
Yagan was killed in 1833 in the course of conflict between Aboriginal inhabitants and colonial 
settlers. 56 
Significantly, the cartoon referred to the mixed ancestry of particular Aboriginal people 
who were involved in the return of Yagan’s head to Australia in a way that suggested 
that they were not ‘real’ Aboriginals. Further, the cartoon suggested that these 
individuals were seeking to use public funds for personal pleasure.57  
The Court held, by majority, that the cartoon was done ‘reasonably and in good faith’.58 
French and Lee JJ held that this required proportionality between the purpose sought to 
be achieved by the respondent’s conduct, and the degree of harm likely to be caused.59 
French J held that including comments that were ‘gratuitously insulting or offensive’ 
would negate proportionality and render the conduct ‘unreasonable’.60 Despite the 
cartoon’s focus on the authenticity of the complainant’s Aboriginality, and the suggested 
opportunism of the group’s use of government funding, and on a dispute between the 
members of the relevant group,61 French J did not find this disproportionate or 
                                                           
51 Ibid. The Explanatory Memorandum simply states that the exemption includes ‘comedy acts’: Explanatory 
Memorandum, Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) 11. 
52 McCutcheon (n 48) 71–2. 
53 Ibid 69. See generally Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) ch 5. 
 
55 Bropho (2004) 204 ALR 761. 
56 Ibid [123] Lee J (dissent). 
57 Ibid [126] Lee J. 
58 French and Carr JJ, Lee J dissenting. 
59 French and Lee JJ agreed on the relevant legal test, although they reached different conclusions on the outcome 
of the case. 
60 Bropho (2004) 204 ALR 761 [81]. 
61 Indeed, the notion of disunity is the punch-line of the cartoon. In the final panels, a child asks, ‘Did [the return of 
Yagan’s head] unite the Nyoongars, Uncle Colbung?’. The Uncle replied, ‘Well, er…’. Yagan’s head in a box says, 
‘Crikey … give me a warm beer in a quiet pommie pub any day!..”. It is unclear whether the purpose asserted in the 
cartoon (promoting unity) was in fact the purpose of the Nyoongar Elders in seeking the return of Yagan’s head.  
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unreasonable. Lee J, on the other hand, held that proportionality required a respondent 
to exercise ‘prudence, caution and diligence’ to minimise the harm of the conduct.62 Lee 
J held that the cartoon constituted a ‘serious slur’63 on members of the group, and it was 
‘at the most serious end of the spectrum’64 of conduct caught by s 18C. He held that 
‘[h]umiliation and intimidation’ lowers other’s regard, by ‘demeaning the worthiness of 
the person or person’s subjected to the conduct’ and it exposes them to contempt.65 
The majority judges emphasised the importance of public discussion and debate 
concerning the return of Yagan’s head to Australia.66 For these judges, the ‘public 
interest’ in this topic was demonstrated by the publication of a number of articles on this 
topic in the respondent newspaper. However, Indigenous scholars have noted that the 
Australian media often promotes negative stereotypes concerning Indigenous 
peoples,67 with one scholar stating that ‘no group exists under the media microscope as 
much as we do’.68 The consistently negative portrayal of Indigenous groups in the 
mainstream media is not a recent phenomenon.69   
When will a racially derogatory cartoon be done ‘reasonably’? 
Although racially derogatory cartoons raise difficult issues for the application of racial 
vilification laws, these are not insurmountable. This article argues that defamation law 
can provide assistance to courts in this area.  
First, whether or not s 18C has been infringed involves an objective assessment of the 
likely impact of the conduct on a reasonable member of the target audience. The 
respondent’s intention or motive (including any intention to be humorous) is not 
determinative. The words used by the respondent and all the surrounding 
circumstances are also considered. Likewise, in defamation law, publications that 
expose a person to ridicule or contempt may attract liability, and courts have stated that 
people who make humorously intended but defamatory statements do so at their own 
risk.70 
In addition, the exemption of ‘artistic work’ in s 18D is not without limits. In particular, to 
be exempt, conduct must be done ‘reasonably and in good faith’. This requirement 
                                                           
62 Ibid [144]. 
63 Ibid [126]. 
64 Ibid [136]. 
65 Ibid [138]. 
66 Ibid Carr J [183]. 
67 Anita Heiss, Am I Black Enough for You? (Bantam, 2012) 167. 
68 Ibid 172. 
69 The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody report, published in 1991, noted the frequently 
negative portrayal of Aboriginal Australians in the mainstream media, and the profound impact of this on public 
attitudes concerning Aboriginal Australians. See Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (National 
Report, Volume 5, 1991) 208 
70 See, eg. Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd [2012] SASCFC 99. 
applies specifically to the publication or distribution of the work, and not to its creation.71 
Therefore, it does not require an assessment of whether the work itself is reasonable, or 
consideration of the value (or otherwise) of artistic freedom. The question, rather, is 
whether it was reasonable to publish the work in the manner and circumstances that it 
was. When a cartoon is published in a newspaper, it is the publisher – not the artist – 
who must have acted reasonably.72 
In Lange,73 the High Court regarded the size of the audience as an extremely relevant 
factor in determining the standard of care required of a respondent media organisation. 
The Court noted that, ‘the damage that can be done when there are thousands of 
recipients of a communication is obviously so much greater than when there are only a 
few recipients.’ Although this was a defamation decision, the same principle applies to 
racial vilification laws. Therefore, when a cartoon is published to a large audience,74 it 
potentially causes great harm to its targets. It follows that those publishing to large 
audiences must exercise great caution to minimise the harm of publishing racially 
derogatory works.   
Finally, in relation to the likely harm caused, there is a significant difference between 
lampooning a public figure, such as a Member of Parliament, and vilifying members of a 
vulnerable minority racial group. First, it can be assumed that public figures have the 
resources to publicly respond to criticism, and that members of minority groups often do 
not. Further, members of such groups are more likely to be stigmatised and excluded by 
such conduct.75 The public dissemination of negative racial stereotypes lowers the 
standing of members of targeted groups in the community, and it lowers their dignity.76 
In addition, the High Court indicated in Lange that there is no benefit to the public in 
inaccurate information on political topics.77 Indeed, whereas the Lange defence seeks to 
enable the public to make informed political decisions, the dissemination of inaccurate 
racial stereotypes directly undermines this goal. 
Conclusion 
                                                           
71 McCutcheon (n 48) 85. As mentioned above, s 18C applies only to conduct that is done ‘otherwise than in 
private’. It does not apply to the often private act of creating the work.  
72 Therefore, the question is whether or not The Australian breached s 18C, not whether Bill Leak did. 
73 (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
74 The cartoon in Bropho was published in a widely circulated newspaper. 
75 The High Court of New Zealand has noted that ‘cartoon representations of Jews, often as physically deformed 
Shylock-like characters consistently acting against the good of the German people, formed part of the propaganda 
employed by the Third Reich and with inevitable consequences in terms of shaping public opinion against that 
particular racial group’: Wall (n 54) [87]. 
76 Waldron (n 16) ch 3. 
77 In Bropho, French J considered an argument that, to be done reasonably, cartoons which comment on political 
issues may require a higher degree of accuracy than artistic works that involve no such commentary: Bropho, 
(2004) 204 ALR 761 [104]-[105]. McCutcheon also distinguishes between artistic works per se and such works that 
involve political commentary: McCutcheon (n 48) 76, 83. 
This article has argued that defamation law can assist courts in determining whether 
racially derogatory cartoons are published ‘reasonably’ under s 18D of the RDA. Section 
18D provides a broad exemption in relation to artistic works, which includes cartoons 
concerning race. However, s 18D depends on the conduct being done ‘reasonably’, and 
this is identical to the requirement of reasonableness under the Lange defence. 
The Lange decision concerns communications relating to politics and government. As 
the quote by Gleeson CJ shows, cartoons concerning race are often presented and 
understood as forms of political commentary. In defamation law, communications to a 
large audience concerning political matters are immune from liability only if the 
respondent has acted ‘reasonably’, by ensuring the accuracy of any information 
presented. This article has argued that these principles should also apply to the artistic 
exemption in s 18D. This is because accurate information is less likely to cause harm to 
target groups (and therefore to be proportionate). Also, significant social harm can be 
caused by the dissemination of crude and inaccurate racial stereotypes. 
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